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The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe 
Hugh G. Henry 
S ince 1942 the Dieppe Raid has been the subject of much controversy and debate 
concerning its political and military background, 
aims, plans, execution and supposed "lessons 
learned." Although historians have documented 
their arguments well, they have not examined 
accurately or in any detail the operations of The 
Calgary Regiment (Tank), 14 Canadian Army 
Tank Regiment ( 14 CATR), Canadian Armoured 
Corps. 1 Some misunderstandings and myths 
concerning the tanks and men, their performance 
and conditions affecting their actions, must be 
dispelled. At this point it is worth noting that not 
only was 14 CATR the first Canadian armoured 
unit ever to go into action, it was the first time in 
history tanks were used in an amphibious 
landing, as well as the baptism of fire for the latest 
British equipment, such as the Tank Landing 
Craft (TLC), the new Churchill tank and its 6-
pounder gun. 
In early 1941 The Calgary Regiment (Tank) 
was mobilised as part of the newly formed 1 
Canadian Army Tank Brigade (1 CATB) and after 
only a few months of extremely basic training, 
first with no vehicles or modem equipment and 
later with Great War vintage, American 
manufactured Renault tanks, the complete 1 
CATB was sent overseas. It was to join the rest of 
the Canadian Army Overseas which formed the 
backbone of Great Britain's defence against the 
expected German invasion. During the remainder 
of the year, besides the normal training of driving 
and maintenance oftanks, wireless instruction, 
map-reading, range firing. reconnaissance and 
tactical training were carried out. In the Spring 
of 1942 several Canadian divisional and corps 
anti-invasion exercises, code-named Beaver, were 
carried out in the open country of Southern 
England. During Beaver III, 14 CATR performed 
the most satisfactorily of all armoured units and 
therefore was chosen for the Dieppe operation. 
In mid-May, 14 CATR moved to the Isle of 
Wight and undertook two months of experimental 
waterproofing of tanks that required much 
improvisation and testing, and practised loading 
and unloading tanks from the TLCs. Several 
amphibious exercises and two rehearsals on June 
11-12 and 22-23, code-named Yukon I and II, in 
the area of West Bay and Bridport on the Dorset 
coast, were carried out with engineers and 
infantry of 2nd Canadian Division to give the tank 
crews experience in supporting other ground units 
assaulting a defended beach. Unfortunately none 
of the beaches had towns fronting them or the 
same stony beaches as at Dieppe. A typical 
exercise began by securing a beachhead, then 
moving a few miles inland over open country to 
capture an objective, such as an airport, and 
finally covering the withdrawal of the infantry to 
the beach before the tanks re-embarked 
themselves. The first exercise was a shambles, 
due mostly to naval errors, resulting in many units 
landing at the wrong beaches, late, or not at all. 
The TLCs themselves were over an hour late. The 
exercise showed the need for better liaison 
between all arms, improved wireless 
communication among all units, and more 
effective smoke cover from air and sea. Yukon II 
was more successful and therefore it was judged 
suitable to proceed with the raid, although naval 
units still had some navigational problems to 
work out. During these exercises 14 CATR never 
underwent street-fighting training with or without 
infantry, in any villages or towns. In the middle of 
August the regiment was ordered to prepare for 
another amphibious assault scheme. All tanks, 
vehicles, ammunition, and personnel were loaded 
on the TLCs at Gosport and Newhaven by August 
18, at which time the men were informed that 
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Before-Above left: Tank training with chespaling. Beginning on 7 August 1942 at Seaford, Sussex, the 
Beach Track Laying Device, which enabled a tank to climb a wall up to 28" high, was developed, tested and 
approved a week later. For the raid thefirst tank on each of the six lead TLCs was to befitted with it. nvo 
days before the operation,jive sets were completed and mounted while the sixth tank could not befitted as 
it had ajlamethrower. During transportation to the coast two sets were damaged and were removed so that 
only three tanks were so equipped for the raid. (Photo: Ed Bennett) 
Above right: Tank landing exercise. During a June 1942 "Yukon" amphibious exercise, beach assault engineers 
practised laying chespaling tracks to give 14 CATR tanks and other vehicles traction over beaches of any 
composition. Of the 71 beach assault engineers who landed at Dieppe, only nine returned, of whom jour 
were wounded. (NAC C138681) 
the exercise would be an actual operation against 
Dieppe. 
The plan originated in early April 1942 at 
Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQJ. 
under the command of Vice-Admiral Lord Louis 
Mountbatten. It was part of a series of raids 
designed to gain experience in amphibious 
operations, and test new techniques and material, 
for the future invasion of the continent. At the 
time, capturing a port in usable condition was a 
fundamental and unchangeable determinate in all 
invasion planning. COHQ planners chose Dieppe 
in this context because they judged it had 
adequate defences to test a divisional-size assault 
while still being within the necessary range of 
fighter cover. The operation, code-named Rutter, 
originally scheduled for 20-21 June 1942, was 
postponed several times in early July and was 
indefinitely cancelled on 7 July due to 
unfavourable weather conditions.2 The decision 
to revive the raid about a week later, redesignated 
Jubilee, and the exact status ofits authorization 
continues to be controversial. 3 A serious 
deficiency in the plan was the cancellation of a 
preliminary heavy naval and air bombardment 
and the lack of heavy naval support artillery.4 
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Instead, four Hunt class destroyers, with only 4. 7-
inch guns, were to briefly bombard, for about ten 
minutes, the buildings and frontal installations 
at Dieppe before switching their fire to the 
headlands on either side of the town where the 
Germans had emplaced heavy coastal guns. 
Similarly, Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief 
of the Air Staff, refused to risk losing bombers 
needed for the strategic bombing of Germany. So 
the heavy air bombardment component was 
dropped. 5 
An important consideration during the 
planning was where to land the tanks. Since all 
planners agreed that rivers had to be avoided, 
the tanks could only land between the mouths of 
the Scie and D'Arques rivers-this meant either 
at the beach at Dieppe or a small part of the beach 
at Pourville two miles to the west. In appreciation 
of the outline plan for Jubilee by 2nd Canadian 
Division, General Staff Officer 1, Lieutenant-
Colonel C. Churchill Mann naively pointed out 
that tanks assaulting Dieppe could give immediate 
fire support to the attacking infantry and 
engineers and cause a psychological shock to the 
Germans and civilian population. Ammunition 
and engineer support material for tanks could 
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be supplied more easily on the main beach where 
the supply craft concentration point was. The 
tanks would also be closer to their planned 
objectives and the beach front was the most 
convenient place for re-embarkation after the 
raid. 
Mann recognised the disadvantages of 
attacking the enemy frontally, the need for 
engineer assault teams, and the difficulty of 
penetrating blocked streets due to bombardment, 
but he pointed out that the garrison only consisted 
of two low-grade infantry companies. Opting in 
favour of the plan, he concluded that the tanks 
would play an important part in the withdrawal 
phase and that, in general, the tanks "seemed to 
have a reasonable prospect ofsuccess."6 
TI1e idea of sending a tank cavalry charge 
through the narrow streets of an enemy defended 
town, and out into the surrounding countryside, 
holding a defensive perimeter and then 
withdrawing through the town, all in the matter 
of five and a half hours, was ridiculously foolhardy 
and reckless. It also showed gross ignorance on 
the part of COHQ planners and senior Allied 
commanders of the capabilities and limitations 
oftanks.7 No one seems to have considered the 
extreme vulnerability of tanks taking part in 
street-fightingin built-up areas. Vision from a tank 
is considerably impaired. If a crew commander 
stuck his head out of the turret to get a clear view, 
he was exposed to enemy sniper fire. Tanks could 
neither protect themselves nor return fire unless 
at some distance from the target because their 
guns could not be elevated very high. Since they 
depended on the infantry they also moved slowly. 
The Assault Plan and Intelligence 
T he assault would be on a front of approximately ten miles at five different 
points. At 0450 hours precisely, after the short 
naval bombardment and air attack by cannon-
equipped Hurricanes and Spitfires, the surprise 
flank attacks would go in, followed half an hour 
later by the main assault on the town. In all, 60 
RAF squadrons were involved in the largest single 
air battle of the war over the Dieppe area. 8 
After-COUGAR, under command of 13 Troop Leader Thomas R. Cornett. successfully crossed the seawall at 
the eastern end of the beach using its chespaUng device. Unable to adequately blow the wading extensions 
and track-laying device, Cornett proceeded west. concentrating his 6-pounder fire on the tobacco factory. 
While maneuvering, COUGAR broke its left track due to the build up of rocks between the front bogey wheel 
and treads. The right track was soon blown by shelifire. The crew evacuated to the beach but not before 
burning out the interior with a sticky bomb, supplied for just such a purpose. 
(Bundesarchiv-MUitararchiv Freiburg RH 20-15!29) 
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During the battle an accurately sited German anti -tank gun and crew lie in wait 
near the end of the Rue de Sygognefor the possible penetration of any tanks. 
(Bundesarchiv 611 12124-5) 
On the flanks, Commam~tt-Jl would capture 
and destroy the coastal batteries about five miles 
east and west of Dieppe, while infantry were to 
neutralise coastal batteries on the east and west 
headlands which dominated the town. 9 The 
Cameron Highlanders of Canada were to advance 
to meet the tanks of"A" and "B" Squadrons, 14 
CA1R, behind the town and then advance against 
another coastal battery, an emergency fighter 
airfield, and the local enemy divisional 
headquarters thought to be atArques-la-Bataille. 
These flank attacks were an essential requirement 
for the success of the main frontal assault, half 
64 
an hour later, and to ensure the safety of the naval 
support vessels. They were, in general, a failure. 
The main attack was to capture the town and 
hold it for a limited period while demolitions were 
carried out. The beach was divided, the eastern 
half (Red Beach) being invaded by the Essex 
Scottish Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-
Colonel Frederick K. Jasperson, while the western 
half (White Beach) was attacked by the Royal 
Hamilton Light Infantry, commanded by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert R. Labatt. Both 
regiments were to be supported by 58 tanks of 
14 CATR. commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
4
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Late in the battle, on 19 August, German reiriforcements climb over the metal gate blocking the Rue de 
Sygogne. This metal gate would not have presented a problem to a 40-ton Churchill tank. Note the 7" high 
and 4-5" wide reinforced concrete anti-tank walL These extended across all the streets to the promenade 
with only a small gap to allow personnel to pass. They were surmounted by barbed wire and had a firing 
step behindjor snipers. (Bundesarchiv 611/2122-16) 
Johnny G. Andrews. Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal and 
"A" Commando of the Royal Marines were to be 
held in reserve. 
In planning Jubilee, COHQ relied on 
imperfect intelligence. Sir F. H. Hinsley, the official 
historian of British intelligence during the Second 
World War, writes that COHQ planners were "over-
reliant on one source" of intelligence, photo 
reconnaissance, and "took at face value" 
intelligence that underestimated the strength of 
the defences and the terrain. 10 Shots taken from 
high elevations did not effectively show any 
defences hidden by building roofs or caves blasted 
into the cliffs of the headlands. 11 
Given the limitations of photographic 
intelligence, it is regrettable that intelligence 
officers did not make a more careful evaluation 
of known defensive positions from the perspective 
of established German tactical doctrine. If COHQ 
had used its knowledge of the enemy order of 
battle and equipment in use, it could have made 
a more realistic and detailed evaluation of the 
defences on the beaches and in the cliffs. In actual 
fact, Dieppe had been turned into a fortress. 12 
The defences were sited in an "anti-raid" role as 
opposed to an "anti-invasion" role meaning that 
the majority of firepower was concentrated to 
cover the beaches. 
The garrison consisted of two battalions and 
staff of the 571 Infantry Regiment amounting to 
approximately 1,500 men. The east and west 
headlands and cliffs contained numerous 
positions ideal for defence. Artillery, machine-gun 
nests, and dual-purpose flak-batteries were all 
sited to bring enfilade fire on the beach, while 
being cleverly hidden in depressions, caves and 
camouflaged bunkers. Allied Intelligence and 
COHQ planners underestimated the numbers and 
calibre of many of these guns. 
The defences in the town itself consisted of 
37 mm and 47 mm anti-tank guns, French 75 
mm beach defence guns and heavy machine-guns 
hidden in buildings fronting the promenade. They 
could fire directly into approaching landing craft. 
The 1 ,500-yard promenade was interspersed with 
concrete pillboxes siting similar weapons. Many 
of these emplacements had connecting trenches 
to open weapon pits from which German soldiers 
could hurl grenades at the crouching troops 
beside the seawall. Finally, the Germans had 
mortars precisely ranged on the beach. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Labatt in an after-action report 
stated that, "stakes for ranging were still standing 
65 
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BERT was immobilized on the promenade when shell fire broke its left track . .lifter the battle it was repaired 
by German engineers and is seen here towing CHIEF off the beach. Bundesarchiv 291 I 1242-2A 
on the beach from a mortar practice carried out 
the preVious day. Their fire plan was well laid out 
and beautifully coordinated."13 
The Chert Beach, Engineers and 
Tank Gadgetry 
A mqjor intelligence blunder was the failure to identifY the exact composition of the beach at 
Dieppe which proved to be the main technical 
difficulty for the tanks. The whole beach is 
composed of chert rocks which range from one 
to six inches in diameter. Stan A Kanik, a former 
trooper of"A" Squadron who was on the raid but 
did not land, returned to Dieppe several times 
after the war, most recently in 1992. Drawing on 
his knowledge as a geological engineer his analysis 
of the beach clearly explains why many tanks had 
difficulty manoeuvring on the beach. He notes: 
"the white cliffs are composed of siliceous chalk, 
interspersed with chert lenses and beds." The 
chalk is easily dissolved and leaves behind the 
chert which under beach erosion is "shaped into 
rounded and oblong stones (rocks) that resist 
cracking or breaking." He continues, "The entire 
beach is composed of chert stones, boulders 
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and rubble," which after tidal action, "eventually 
rest at an "angle of repose" of about 15 to 20 
degrees. Secondly, these rocks will extend many 
meters in depth, so vehicles cannot dig down 
to a solid rock base for traction. When a tracked 
or wheeled vehicle tries to climb up this slope, 
it immediately digs itself down; when the tracks 
are turned to either side the stones roll in 
between the drive sprocket and track and the 
object that first gives way is the pins holding 
the track links."14 
All regimental and standard histories 
referring to Dieppe claim its beach is composed 
of"shale" or "pebbles." The Allies had carried out 
landing tests with the tanks on the firm, sandy 
beaches of the Isle of Wight and on the small, 
pebbly beaches of Dorset, but not on a chert 
beach, such as found at Dover. The Germans, who 
had many such trials, found their tanks became 
bellied down and stuck and did not site any heavy 
anti-tank guns or place anti-tank mines on the 
beach in front of the town since they thought the 
beaches were not negotiable by tanks. 
COHQ planned for the Royal Canadian 
Engineers (RCE) to aid the tanks in surmounting 
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any obstacles. The RCE were divided into two 
main groups-the Beach Assault Party (under 
Major Bert Sucharov) and the Demolition Party 
(under Lieutenant-Colonel L. F. Barnes) and then 
subdivided into various sized detachments and 
squads depending on their tasks and distributed 
throughout the TLCs. 
The Beach Assault Party was responsible for 
getting all troops, stores, tanks and other vehicles 
from the point of touchdown by the naval craft 
onto, across, and clear of the beach area. This 
meant clearing minefields, demolishing anti-tank 
concrete road blocks at the exits of the promenade 
and, using bulldozers to clear boulders, preparing 
ramps for evacuation and generally keep the 
beaches clear. If needed, these machines could 
also aid vehicles stuck on the beach and push off 
grounded landing craft. Ensuring that the tanks 
crossed over the beach and the seawall were the 
most important tasks of the Beach Assault Party. 
The plan was to have four-man squads, carried 
in the first six TLCs, run out ahead of the lead 
tanks to lay chespaling tracks, which were flexible 
rolls of chestnut fencing, "similar to wood-slat 
snow fencing but made With tough split-slats." 
The bundles weighed about 250 pounds, were 
approximately 25 feet long and could be Wired 
together to form a continuous track. These 
tracks could be moved around by the engineers 
to suit the later flights of incoming TLCs. 15 All 
tanks, carriers and jeeps then passed over these 
tracks, only becoming bogged down if they 
swerved off them. Since many of the scout cars 
had experienced difficulty during training even 
on the chespaling, it was decided that during 
the operation these should be towed ashore by 
the tanks. Note that the pebbles on the Dorset 
beach are small, up to two inches in diameter, 
whereas at Dieppe they are up to six inches. 
The seawall was estimated to be up to six 
feet in height. The Rutter plan of using sappers 
to blow gaps in the wall had been dropped in 
favour of building timber crib ramps beside it 
for the tanks to climb. Under favourable 
conditions a highly trained detachment of thirty 
engineers could carry the five tons of material 
necessary thirty yards and build a ramp beside 
a seven-foot wall in five minutes. 16 Due to the 
intensity of German firing, no timbers were ever 
unloaded. 
BERT & CHIEF shown on the promenade. Four types qf Churchill tanks were used at Dieppe. The Mark I 
had a cast turret holding a 2-pounder and .303 Besa machine gun, and a 3-inch howitzer in the hull; the 
Mark II was the same except that a second Besa replaced the howitzer; the Mark II Oke was a Mark II with 
the Ronson flamethrower apparatus added; the Mark III had a welded turret holding the newly-developed 6-
pounder gun, a Be sa positioned to the left of it, and a Besa in the hull. (Bundesarchiv 291 I 1242-6) 
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Major Sucharov was assigned to develop a 
device to enable the tanks to get over the seawall. 
He came up with a carpet-laying device using 
chespaling. He designed an apparatus to hold one 
roll of chespaling, three feet wide (the width of 
one track was twenty-two inches) and about 
twenty-five to thirty feet long, in front of each track. 
Controlled electrically from the turret, the ends 
of the rolls could be released when the tank was 
the appropriate distance from the seawall. The 
rolls would then be gradually dragged under the 
tank's tracks. The tank could then mount up to a 
28-inch wall without problem. Mter use, the whole 
apparatus could be jettisoned by an explosive 
charge, electrically set off from inside the turret. 
The device was demonstrated to Lieutenant-
Colonel Andrews and approved by him on 14 
August. 17 Finally, the Beach Assault Party was 
responsible for preparing for the successful re-
embarkation of all tanks and vehicles. 
The Demolition Party was charged with 
demolishing power stations, petrol dumps, 
dockyard, dry-docks, swing bridges, gas works, 
pumping stations, telephone exchanges and rail 
facilities. The group was split up into many small 
squads, each with its own commanding officer, 
and assigned precise objectives to be sabotaged 
once the infantry and tanks secured a perimeter 
around the town. Most of these squads never got 
off the beach. Indeed, the engineers had about 
85 to 90 per cent casualties- the highest rate in 
the raid. 18 
The tanks themselves had been adapted for 
amphibious operations up to a depth of six feet 
using rubber balloon fabric. Tall, box-shaped 
ducts (known as louvre extensions) were fitted to 
the air intake vents and the exhaust pipes were 
extended so as to be well above the water line. 
The waterproofing and the louvre extensions 
could be blown off by electrically-triggered cordite 
charges placed underneath them. The 
waterproofing procedure was still in the 
experimental stage and had never been tested 
under battle conditions. 
These were the plans and preparations of 
COHQ and the regiments involved. No contingency 
plans for failure existed so success now depended 
on the individuals of the assaulting force. 
68 
The Attack Begins 
T hirty minutes prior to the TLC's touchdown, the tanks were to start warming up their 
engines. Two types ofTLC were used and could 
hold three or four tanks and one or two smaller 
vehicles. Radio silence was maintained until zero 
hour. The infantry were to land first, followed 
immediately by the TLCs carrying the engineers 
and tanks which would give immediate 
supporting fire. Charles P. Stacey, the official 
historian of the Canadian Army in the Second 
World War, points out: "In any opposed landing, 
the first minute or two after the craft touch down 
are of crucial importance; and it may be said that 
during that minute or two the Dieppe battle, on 
the main beaches, was lost. The impetus of the 
attack ebbed quickly away, and by the time the 
tanks arrived the psychological moment was 
past."19 
The first wave of tanks of 14 CATR arrived 
about ten minutes late due to navigational error. 20 
During this critical period, the infantry had no 
fire support and the German defenders were able 
to recover from the short preliminary air and 
naval bombardment and man their weapons. 
Thus, the assaulting infantry were caught trying 
to blast gaps in the unexpectedly strong rows of 
wire, the majority becoming pinned down at the 
seawall, unable to dig slit trenches in the rocks. 
The Essex Scottish tried three times to cross the 
promenade but were repulsed each time with 
heavy casualties. Thereafter, they could only 
return fire from the limited protection of the 
seawall. By about 0630 hours, only an hour or 
so after landing, they had suffered at least 75 per 
cent casualties. 
On White Beach, the Royal Hamilton Light 
Infantry were initially held up by the strongly-
fortified Casino. Mter stiff fighting, they cleared 
it despite many casualties. From the Casino they 
gave covering fire to some small groups 
attempting to penetrate the town. These units 
engaged in minor house-to-house and street 
fighting incidents with German patrols until they 
started to run out of ammunition. When they 
attempted to withdraw to the Casino, some were 
taken prisoner in the process. The infantry, 
initially pinned down behind the rows of barbed 
wire and seawall, were only able to pass these 
obstacles and later take the Casino after the first 
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flights of TLCs disembarked the supporting 
engineers and tanks. 
Flight 1 and lA consisted of six TLCs and 
landed between approximately 0525 and 0535 
hours, five to fifteen minutes late, carrying a total 
of eighteen tanks. On touching down four of the 
TLCs were heavily shelled, becoming so badly 
damaged and killing the majority of the naval 
crews, that one was sunk and three were unable 
where one was immobilised by the chert. 21 The 
remaining 12 tanks never got off the beach; four 
had their tracks broken by shellfire, four by the 
chert and three most likely by the chert, although 
this is not certain. The last tank chose to stay on 
the beach and was mobile for the duration of the 
battle. 22 The tanks on the promenade drove back 
and forth, unable to penetrate the town because 
of the huge concrete road blocks, on which the 
tanks' puny armour-piercing shells had no effect. 
BEETLE was the last of three Churchill Mark II Oke flamethrower tanks of 8 Troop, "B" Squadron to exit 
TLC-3, seen stranded in the background. Immediately after landing its right track broke while turning on 
the rocks forcing it to act as a stationary pillbox until the surrender. Note the armoured flamethrower fuel 
box at the back and the Ronson nozzle pointing up at the front. None of the flamethrowers were used during 
the raid. (ECPA DAA 281-3L8) 
to withdraw, becoming stranded on the beach. 
Flight 2 of four TLCs carried a total of twelve tanks 
and beached on schedule at 0605 hours. All tanks 
disembarked except for one, unable to do so due 
to the intensity of fire. Although only one TLC 
was sunk, the others were so severely damaged 
that they had to be towed back to England. 
Of the 29 tanks that attempted to land, two 
drowned and the rest made it to shore. Of these 
27, 15 crossed the seawall, although 10 ultimately 
returned to the beach in the area of the Casino, 
The engineers and sappers had suffered 
tremendous casualties and could not demolish 
these concrete barriers. The remaining two flights 
ofTLCs carrying the whole of"A" Squadron and 
the remaining three troops of "C" Squadron, a 
total of 28 tanks, were never sent in. The two 
tank beach parties, instead of carrying out their 
planned initial tasks of directing the tanks to their 
objectives, spent most of their time in assisting 
wounded and organising tank cover for the 
general withdrawal. 
69 
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At 1100 hours, the senior tank officer 
ashore, Major Allen Glenn, Officer Commanding 
"C" Squadron, ordered all remaining mobile 
tanks to withdraw to the beach and take up 
defensive positions to cover the withdrawing 
infantry. It seems that the Germans were 
preparing for an infantry counterattack which 
the tanks probably deterred. By noon all tanks 
had been immobilised, 14 with broken tracks, 
although many continued to fire until they ran 
out of ammunition. All 14 CATR veterans and 
Allied reports claim no tanks' armour was 
penetrated by anti-tank fire while crews were 
still in them, although German reports and a 
photo, reveal that two were penetrated. 23 This 
probably occurred after the crews evacuated 
and the Germans moved their anti-tank guns 
closer. Any casualties to 14 CATR personnel 
occurred outside the tanks. Contemporary 
reports that some tanks actually entered the 
back streets of the town are false. 24 The crews 
were ordered to evacuate at 1225 hours, 
whereupon they destroyed their tanks with the 
two "sticky bombs" provided for this purpose. 
Some crews were unable to do so because the 
blast would have endangered the many men 
who were by now using the tanks as cover. At 
1300 hours, about the time of general surrender 
on Red and White beaches, General Roberts 
sent out the code-word VANCOUVER, the signal 
for the entire naval force to turn around and 
head back to port. 25 
Conclusion 
T he raid failed because the Jubilee Plan was too inflexible, complicated and lacked 
essential heavy bombardment from sea and air. 
All units had precise objectives but there were no 
contingency plans. Another serious fault was the 
COHQ's neglect in using the air I ground 
cooperation and support structure available to 
it. The Army liaison officer attached to the Royal 
Air Force headquarters, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Charles Carrington, later wrote that there was 
"nothing to be learned from Dieppe, except how 
not to do it, a little late in the war to learn that 
lesson. "26 This remark is also correct in reference 
to the raid in general. Other obvious defects were 
an over-reliance on tactical surprise, which was 
not achieved, inadequate inter-service 
communications and supporting naval fire, and 
70 
a lack of intelligence on the defences. 27 One 
German report found it "astonishing" that the 
strength of the defences were underestimated 
since most of the details should have been obvious 
from aerial reconnaissance photos. Also 
surprising was the short duration expected to 
carry the operation out and the inflexibility of the 
plan. This report concluded that: "It is 
inconceivable why they did not support the 
battalions which landed near Pourville with tanks. 
An attack with tanks from Pourville against the 
hill west ofDieppe and against the "4 Ventes" Farm 
might have been successful, although it would 
have been most difficult to overcome the anti-tank 
walls, the pier and the Scie [River] dam."28 
From the point of view of 14 CATR, the major 
intelligence failure was not correctly identifying 
the geological nature of Dieppe's chert beach, 
which defeated at least six (probably nine) tanks, 
in other words, one-third oftanks ashore. Major 
Sucharov's beach track-laying device attached to 
some of the lead tanks had not, as many 
historians claim, been meant to aid the tanks over 
this hazardous obstacle. This is obvious since 
the length of chespaling carried was only slightly 
longer than the tank itself, whereas the beach was 
30 to 50 yards wide depending on the tide. 
Instead, the device was designed to give a tank 
traction at the moment of crossing the two-foot-
high seawall. Two of the three tanks carrying this 
device successfully used it as it was designed, 
although COUGAR, 13 Troop "C" Squadron, had 
problems jettisoning the apparatus which had 
either been damaged by enemy shellfire or was 
technically faulty. 29 
The success of the experimental 
waterproofing and deep wading attachments on 
the tanks cannot be determined because almost 
all the TLCs landed dry and many tanks received 
damage to their exhaust and air intake louvres 
and waterproofing before and while exiting the 
TLCs, resulting in two drowning. Most of these 
problems were caused either by the tanks 
scraping against the sides of the TLCs or by enemy 
fire. At least one tank, BULL, 8 Troop "B" the 
Canadian War Museumthe Canadian War 
Museum Squadron, had one of its louvres 
knocked off before disembarking, probably by the 
concussion of an exploding shell. 30 Some tank 
crews were unable, or only partially able, to blow 
the waterproofing and wading attachments, 
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Many high-ranking German officials and officers 
came to inspect the aftermath of the raid. Near 
Dieppe, Sepp Dietrich (left) and Albert Speer (right, 
facing camera) examine captured Churchills and 
observefiring tests. In the background is CAT, which 
was disabled on the promenade by a hit from a JU-87 
Stuka dive bomber. (Bundesarchiv 291 I 1243-20 
probably because the charges had been 
damaged by enemy fire. A few crews even had 
to manually cut this away, either because the 
partially blown fabric had jammed their turret 
traverse or obscured their vision ports. Proper 
testing of this equipment under actual fire, 
especially during disembarking training, would 
have revealed its vulnerability. No arrangement 
was made for shedding the exhaust 
extensions. 31 
The tanks were also severely undergunned. 
Eleven of the tanks had 2-pounders, which were 
like peashooters, while the other 18 had 6-
pounders (approximately 55 mm calibre). 
Although the latter was the most modem British 
gun, it was still obsolete when compared with the 
German long-barrelled 75 mm turret gun in use 
at the time. 32 The 6-pounder tanks did not even 
have high explosive shells since they were still in 
the development stage. Six-pounder turret jams 
were caused by shellfire hitting the turret ring. 
Some tanks had either their radio, electrical, 
hydraulic or steering systems damaged by anti-
tank and dive bomber hits. All these difficulties 
were technical problems that could have been 
foreseen with more testing, especially under 
actual fire. (The necessary firing tests were 
carried out after the operation.) The new 6-
pounder gun also jammed on many occasions, 
even though it had been tested before the raid. 
The guns were test fired with only five or six 
rounds, due to the shortage of ammunition, and 
at a low rate of fire. During the battle crews 
obviously fired as quickly as possible. The high 
rate of fire was concluded as the reason for the 
jams and also revealed the tanks' normal 
stowage of ammunition was insufficient for an 
operation of this type. 33 
A German military appreciation concerning 
the Churchill tank in the operation, and intended 
for internal distribution (as opposed to use for 
propaganda purposes) started by saying that the 
tank, "offers nothing worthy of consideration by 
technical personnel, nor has it any new 
constructive features either in the metallurgical 
field or in the field of weapon technology." 
Squadron Sergeant-Major Gerry M. Menzies, crew 
commander of BERT, captured near where his tank 
was disabled. Note the Casino. the west headland 
and one of the many German slit trenches in the 
background. (Bundesarchiv Koblenz 611 12124-14) 
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Commenting on their armament, the 3-inch 
howitzer and 2-pounder were considered 
obsolete, while the 6-pounder performance did 
not compare to the Russian equivalent. The 
armour thickness was considered good but of 
poor quality, compared to that used on German 
and Russian vehicles. The shape of the tank was 
considered outdated with the armour offering "a 
considerable angle of impact." The report 
concluded that the tracks were "made of very 
brittle material" of"clumsy design" and "fractured 
every time" they received a direct hit, which did 
not occur with German and Russian tracks. On 
testing the tanks it was found that the 
considerable track noise definitely inhibited the 
use of the wireless, to the point where the tanks 
had to stop to be able to hear radio transmitted 
speech. On the whole, the report gave the 
Churchill a very low rating, finishing, "in its 
present form, is easy to combat. "34 
Concerning the other vehicles landed, at least 
two scout cars were rammed by their towing-
tanks, probably because tank crews forgot about 
them in the excitement of battle and confusion 
caused by the unexpected fierce enemy resistance. 
Four others were towed ashore as planned but 
then became bogged down or were hit by shell-
fire. One did make the promenade but, on 
returning to the beach, was disabled by a mortar 
bomb. Only one universal carrier and one jeep 
landed, both not moving off the beach. None of 
the bulldozers landed, although one was left in 
the back of the stranded TLC-3. 35 
Although most of the technical problems of 
the tanks and other vehicles could have been 
avoided through more realistic testing and 
training, under simulated battle conditions using 
live ammunition, ( 14 CATR had less than two 
months of amphibious assault training before the 
raid), it probably would not have made much 
difference to the overall outcome of the battle. 
The objectives and orders of 14 CATR in the 
raid showed the shattering ineptness of COHQ's 
tactical planning and the inadequacy of Allied 
armoured doctrine at this stage in the war. The 
futile decision to send tanks into a heavily fortified 
town was based on the outdated armoured tactics 
of the Great War. 
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To have planned a tank attack across a 
chert beach without trial on a similar beach, 
such as available at Dover, is, in afterthought, 
incomprehensible. Additionally, the idea of using 
tanks, with their very limited gun elevation and 
visual capabilities, to fight through a major 
built-up area, without considerable support, 
indicates gross ignorance or deliberate 
overlooking of the operational limitations of 
tanks. Only one sniper's bullet is necessary to 
kill a crew commander who tries to improve 
vision by putting his head outside the turret. 
The plan is astonishing when it is recalled 
that 14 CATR had been trained for infantry 
support either in the open countryside or on the 
sandy beaches ofthe Isle ofWight. The regiment 
never had any training in the complex and 
dangerous type of close-quarter house-to-house 
fighting, necessitating extremely close infantry 
cooperation, that it would have encountered if its 
tanks had been able to penetrate the narrow 
streets. 
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing 
comments, it is fitting to pay tribute to the 
courageous action of the Calgary Regiment's tank 
crews in providing covering fire to help the few 
infantry and other survivors to evacuate Dieppe 
beach. This effort explains why all except three 
of the men were taken prisoner. These valiant men 
fought until all their ammunition had been used 
up, by which time they had to choose between 
death, if they left the shelter of their tanks, or 
imprisonment if they stayed inside their tanks 
until taken prisoner. It was a painful yet obvious 
choice and a sad ending to one of the worst defeats 
in Canadian military history. 
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